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Macksofy Technologies
Manufacturing · DFIR
India · Mid-market · 2025

LockBit variant contained in 11 hours — manufacturer back to 80% production within 72h of first encrypted file

A 1,400-employee manufacturer in Pune called Macksofy at 02:14 IST after a LockBit variant began encrypting file shares. Forensic team on-site by 06:30. Containment achieved at hour 11. Eighty per cent of production systems back online within 72 hours from clean backups.

ManufacturingDFIRRansomwareLockBitPuneOT SecurityIncident Response
Engagement summary
Client
Mid-size Manufacturer (Maharashtra)
Sector
Manufacturing
Region
India
Engagement
DFIR
Year
2025
Duration
Containment 11h · Full IR 21 days
11h
Time to containment
72h
Time to 80% recovery
0
Ransom paid
0
Confirmed data exfiltrated
In short

How quickly can a LockBit ransomware attack be contained?

Containment speed depends on preparation rather than luck. At a 1,400-employee Maharashtra manufacturer, Macksofy was on-site within hours of a 02:14 call and contained a LockBit variant at hour 11; 80% of production was restored from clean backups inside 72 hours. No ransom was paid and no exfiltration was confirmed.

The challenge

What the client was up against.

First encrypted file at 23:47, panic by midnight

An IT engineer noticed file extensions changing on a shared drive at 23:47. By 00:30 multiple systems were encrypted. The internal team had a tabletop-grade IR plan but had never run live containment against a credentialed adversary already inside the network.

OT exposure was the real fear

Beyond the corporate file-share, the plant's MES (Manufacturing Execution System) shared a flat network with corporate IT. If the ransomware crossed into OT, the plant would lose visibility into batches in progress — a regulatory and contractual problem with auto-OEM customers.

Approach

How we ran the engagement, phase by phase.

Phase 01

01 · 30-minute bridge call · 02:14 IST

  • Triage call with CIO + IT manager + plant operations head
  • Established a unified incident bridge (Slack + voice) with strict comms discipline
  • Stand-down internal 'fix it ourselves' attempts before they destroyed evidence
Phase 02

02 · On-site forensic team · 06:30 IST

  • Two-person forensic team on-site at the Pune plant
  • Triage agents deployed across DC, OT-edge gateways and the file servers
  • Volatile-evidence preservation on patient-zero before any reboots
Phase 03

03 · Containment · hour 11

  • Identified patient-zero: an internet-exposed RDP host with leaked credentials
  • Cut the AD-trust between corp and plant networks at hour 7
  • Isolated 18 actively-encrypting hosts; killed PsExec lateral movement at hour 11
Phase 04

04 · Eradication + recovery

  • Validated backup integrity offline before any restoration
  • Rebuilt domain controllers from gold images; rotated all privileged credentials
  • Restored 80% of production-critical systems from backups within 72h of first encryption
Phase 05

05 · Lessons-learned + tabletop exercise

  • CERT-In incident-reporting filed within statutory window
  • Root-cause analysis: exposed RDP + leaked credentials + flat network
  • Tabletop exercise re-run with new playbooks 6 weeks post-incident
Findings

What we surfaced — severity, title, real-world impact.

Critical

Internet-exposed RDP on a legacy bastion

A historical jump-server retained 3389/tcp exposed to the internet. The credentials had appeared on a credential-stuffing dump six months prior — never rotated.

Critical

Flat L2 between corporate IT and the plant MES network

No segmentation between corporate file shares and the plant MES network. If the actor had pivoted 4 hours later, plant visibility would have been lost.

High

Weekly backups, no offline copy

Backups existed but were online and writeable from a compromised tier-1 admin account. Two recent backup chains were already encrypted; older chains were viable.

High

Lateral movement via PsExec unflagged

The estate had no detection on PsExec or remote service creation — the actor's primary lateral-movement technique ran unnoticed for two hours.

Outcome

What changed for the client.

Production back online inside 72 hours

Eighty per cent of production-critical systems restored from clean backups in under 72 hours from the first encrypted file. Zero confirmed data exfiltration. No ransom paid.

OT/IT segmentation hardened

Within 30 days the manufacturer rolled out a hardware firewall between corporate and plant networks, with one-way replication for MES telemetry. The flat-network class of risk was eliminated.

Backup architecture rebuilt

New 3-2-1 backup posture with an air-gapped offline copy, immutable storage on the cloud tier, and quarterly restore drills now run by Macksofy as part of an ongoing IR retainer.

We called at 2 AM. By breakfast their forensic team was on our shop floor. Eleven hours later the bleeding stopped. We're now on a Macksofy IR retainer — never want a 2 AM scramble like that again.
CIO · Mid-size Manufacturer (Maharashtra)
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